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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Designed to  give an impetus to  the defmition and arrangements for an EU-Russian Energy 
Partnership  to  be  established  within  the  framework  of the  Partnership  and  Co-operation 
Agreement (PCA)
1
,  the Energy Dialogue was launched at  the  EU-Russian Summit of 30th 
October 2000 in Paris
2
• It is to be seen within the context of  the "Common Strategy of  the EU 
on Russia"
3
, adopted by the European Council in June 1999, which underlined the aim of the 
PCA as  "promoting the  integration of Russia  into  a wider area of co-operation in Europe 
(and)  ... creating the necessary conditions for the future  establishment of a free  trade area 
between the European Community and Russia". 
The remit of the Energy Dialogue was defined in the Joint Statement to the Summit of  Paris 
as providing a framework within which all issues of common interest in the energy sector, 
including  co-operation  on  energy  saving,  rationalisation  of  production  and  transport 
infrastructures can be jointly examined and discussed. It is designed to achieve a substantial 
breakthrough, over the medium term, in a specific sector where there is strong mutual interest 
and  where  relations  are  already  well  established.  Commitments  achieved  through  this 
dialogue in the energy sector could then serve as a model for other sectors. 
The preparatory phase  from  February through  to  September  2001  saw  groups  of experts 
analysing  areas  of common interest  in  the  energy  sector  and  the  presentation  of a joint 
Synthesis Report to the October 2001 EU-Russia Summit. 
2.  THE FuTURE DIRECTION ESTABLISHED BY THE EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS
4
• 
The Joint Statement from  the  EU-Russia Summit of 3rd  October 2001  in Brussels clearly 
recognised that the Energy Dialogue was now entering its next, operational stage following 
the  completion  of the  initial  analytical  phase.  It established  the  future  directions  of the 
Dialogue by drawing attention to a number of the conclusions and recommendations of the 
experts, recognising that, in the short term, progress could be obtained in the following areas: 
improvement  of the  legal  basis  for  energy  production  and  transport  in  Russia, 
completion of  the regulatory provisions for production sharing agreements (PSA) and a 
mechanism for assisting investors in the energy sector, aimed primarily at simplifying 
administrative and licensing procedures, which are essential preconditions for boosting 
European investment in the energy sector; 
1  The PCA with Russia was signed in June 1994 and came into force on December l ••  1997. 
Published in the Official Journal of  the European Communities L 327 of28.ll.l997, page 3. 
2  The 6'b Summit to be held since the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia came into force. 
3  Common Strategy of  the European Union of  4 June 1999 on Russia. 
Published in the Official Journal ofthe European Communities L 157 of24.06.l999, page I. 
4  Russia-EU Summit. Joint Statement. 
External Relations press release: Nr:  12423/01 (Press 342). (http://ue.eu.intinewsroom/) 
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legal security for long-term energy supplies, recognising the important role played in 
this  context by long-term contracts  and energy markets in ensuring energy security. 
Russia stresses the importance it attaches to long-term "take or pay" contracts; 
ensuring  the  physical  security of transport  networks.  In  this  context,  the  European 
Union is ready to co-operate in the networks, in particular those used for exports, if  and 
when this is considered necessary by the Parties. The development of a regional satellite 
monitoring  system  for  accident  prevention  and  leak  detection  for  oil  and  gas 
infrastructures will be examined; 
the recognition of certain new transport infrastructures as being of "common interest", 
such  as  the  Yamal-Europe  gas  pipeline  network  through  Belarus  and  Poland,  the 
northern  trans-European  gas  pipeline,  the  development  of the  Shtokman  field,  the 
connection of the Druzhba oil transmission system through Belarus and Ukraine with 
the  Adria network and the  interconnection of the Parties' electricity networks, which 
will ensure non-discriminatory transit of energy products and increased supplies to the 
EU  and  the  candidate  countries.  Such  projects,  and  the  choice  of routes,  are  the 
responsibility of  the States and companies concerned; 
in the light of  the importance of  rational energy use and savings, it is recommended that 
pilot projects in the Arkhangelsk and Astrakhan regions of  Russia be carried out as soon 
as  possible. During 2002, detailed summary reports for these regions will have to be 
drawn up with financial support from various European sources including industry. This 
should create a basis for the implementation of  other such regional projects. 
The Summit also recognised that certain important issues required further examination and 
technical study: 
- the potential and merits of an investment guarantee scheme which would mitigate non-
commercial risks; 
a study of  the prospects that the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol could offer 
to Russia for attracting investment in the modernisation of  its energy sector; 
the  conditions  for  reinforcing  energy research  and  technology co-operation,  notably 
through the creation of a Russia-EU Energy Technology Centre in Moscow. The added 
value of  co-operation between such a centre and any national energy centre set up under 
bilateral co-operation between Russia and an EU Member State should be taken into 
account; 
certain preconditions which should be required for the  supply of electricity,  such as 
sufficient availability of installed capacity on the Russian market, measures to  protect 
the environment and a high level of nuclear safety, comparable to those in force in the 
EU Member States; 
- a study of  the possibilities for common implementation of  energy-saving and renewable 
energy projects,  in particular by drawing up  a  catalogue of such projects  in Russia 
which could be financed under the joint implementation mechanism provided for in the 
Kyoto Protocol; 
- the  organisation  of training  in  corporate  governance  (i.e.:  international  accounting 
standards, rights of  minority shareholders etc). 
3 3.  PROGRESS SINCE THE LAST SUMMIT 
During the fmal months of 2001, discussions were held with the Russian authorities, as well 
as representatives from European and Russian energy industries, to examine the modalities of 
implementing concrete actions in line with the priorities identified in the Summit conclusions. 
The Energy Dialogue was discussed at the  5th  EU-Russia Co-operation Committee meeting 
held in Brussels on 30November 2001, and preparatory discussions have been held to define 
a programme of work for the coming year,  based on the points set out in the annex to  the 
Summit Joint Statement. The state of  each dossier is detailed below. 
The Russian side has indicated that an appropriate framework within the PCA is needed to 
pursue the Dialogue. The present Sub-committee on Energy, Environment and Nuclear Safety 
issues would not, in their view, be an appropriate vehicle for the whole range of  contacts. 
The  Council  preferred,  in  the  course  of the  preparation  of the  Co-operation  Committee 
meeting, not to recommend dividing this sub-committee, but concluded that this issue could 
be pursued in the context of an overall review of the sub-committee structure. As it will take 
some time to  consider this more general question, one solution would be to  leave the sub-
committee in its present form for the moment and to  use the Co-operation Committee as  a 
vehicle for incorporating high-level contacts into the PCA structure. The possibility exists for 
the Co-operation Committee to meet as often as necessary and for it to concentrate on specific 
issues (as is already the case with Kaliningrad). In line with the annex to the Summit Joint 
Statement,  a report on progress  should be prepared in time for  the May 2002  Summit in 
Moscow. 
At  all  times  in  the  discussions  with  Russia,  the  interests  and  concerns  of the Candidate 
Countries have been and will  continue to  be taken into account, bearing in  mind  that  the 
objective of the Dialogue is to enhance the energy security of the European continent. The 
Commission will  continue to  keep  the  Candidate Countries informed of developments and 
progress in the Energy Dialogue with Russia. 
Despite  the  continued  insistence  of the  European  Union  on  the  importance  of Russian 
ratification of the  Energy Charter Treaty,  it  has  to  be noted that little  progress  has  been 
achieved, particularly in the light of  the declarations made by the Russian representatives on 
the occasion of  the 1Oth Anniversary of  the Charter. 
Relevant developments in the energy sector. 
With  respect  to  energy  developments  since  the  October  2001  Summit,  the  beginning of 
December 2001  saw Russia finally give way to the intense pressure from OPEC to reduce oil 
exports. OPEC had decided at its meeting on 14 November to reduce production quotas by 1.5 
million barrels per day to  stop  the  slide in international oil prices,  provided that the non-
OPEC oil exporters reduced their production by 0.5 million barrels per day. Mexico, followed 
by Norway, indicated within a week a willingness to reduce their production provided the 
other producers did likewise. Given the technical difficulties of reducing production, Russia 
finally committed on 5 December 2001  to reducing oil exports by 150,000 barrels per day 
from  1 January 2002 through to  31  March 2002, but not the level of production. While oil 
exports are normally reduced at this time of  year due to the greater demand resulting from the 
climatic conditions in Russia, the commitment to OPEC has lead to an oversupply on Russia's 
internal market and a build up of stocks. Internal oil prices in Russia are currently around 5.3 
US dollars a barrel, a reduction of  more than 50% in the past three months and, in most cases, 
below the cost of production (which ranges from 5 to 7 US dollars a barrel). With the end of 
4 winter  approaching,  combined  with  the  determination  of the  Russian  oil  companies  to 
substantially increase production as  a result of their heavy recent investments, Vice-Prime 
Minister  Khristenko  announced  on  30  January  2002  that  the  Russian  Government  was 
considering the creation of a special oil reserve to alleviate the glut on the domestic market. 
He also  expressed an interest in the  ideas contained in the Commission's Green Paper on 
Security of  Energy Supply for a better use of  Community oil stocks. 
3.1  Improvement of the legal basis for energy production and transport in Russia. 
While  Russia  has  made  significant  strides  in  reforming  its  economy,  many  international 
companies still perceive that investing in Russia involves higher than "normal" commercial 
risks.  So  long  as  this  perception  continues,  Russia  will  find  it  challenging  to  attract  the 
necessary levels of foreign investment foreseen under its new energy strategy. 
To obtain investment funds at a reasonable price, there is a need for a more stable legislative 
and taxation regime.  Energy companies,  be they Russian or foreign,  are used  to  handling 
geological  and  market  risks.  However,  worries  about  the  legislative  and  taxation  regime 
increases  the  "risk  premium"  element  in  the  discounting  rates  that  investors,  Russian  or 
foreign,  use in evaluating investment projects.  The  costs of capital rise,  and economically 
marginal fields will not be developed. 
However, it is evident that the necessary reforms still to  be carried out will take some time. 
Until these have been progressed considerably further, international companies will hesitate to 
take  on the  risks  involved in concession or  licensing  agreements,  or investing  in  Russian 
companies as minority shareholders. So, at least for this interim period, it is important that a 
secure  legal  framework,  such  as  that  offered  by  a  comprehensive  and  efficient  PSA 
(Production Sharing Agreement) regime, is established to provide the European investors with 
the  necessary  legal  and  fiscal  stability.  Evidently  over  the  medium  to  longer  term,  as 
European companies become more confident in the evolving legal and tax regime in Russia, 
other legal frameworks  can be examined for facilitating investments in energy exploration, 
production and transportation, such as Joint Ventures and concessions. 
In contrast to other areas of the EU -Russia Energy Dialogue, no progress has been made on 
this issue. PSAs remain a sensitive issue in Russia and this is reflected in the slow progress 
being made in completing the normative  acts.  The local  Russian oil  companies,  operating 
under concession arrangements, are opposed to a PSA regime as they claim it gives an unfair 
commercial advantage to  European companies by suppressing certain elements of risk (such 
as the risk of  new fiscal measures) while maintaining the same financial rewards. On the other 
hand,  it  is  absolutely vital  that a suitable legal framework is  drawn up which will provide 
European companies with the kind of fiscal  certainty and legal  security offered by PSAs. 
Without such a framework, European companies will not embark on large scale investments 
in  the  Russian  energy  sector.  It cannot  be  excluded  that  Russia  will  link  progress  on 
improving the PSA regime to solving the current difficulties surrounding long-term contracts. 
This is currently the major issue which needs to be resolved in the Dialogue. It is regrettable 
that Russia has not been prepared, to date, to accept the technical assistance on offer to help 
draft  the  necessary  normative  acts  such  as  the  calculation  of "cost  recovery"  and  those 
addressing taxation issues. 
3.2  Legal security for long-term energy supplies. 
Both the EU and Russia recognise that long term gas contracts have played an important role 
in  the  development  of the  European gas  market  by providing  a  risk  sharing  arrangement 
5 
.... ·r. between producers and buyers, enabling in turn important new production and infrastructure 
projects to be undertaken. They are, and will re~ain, important in European gas supply. 
While these are  an  essential  element for energy security, these contracts must necessarily 
evolve  with  the  effective  disappearance  of boundaries  within  the  EU.  The  strategies  of 
commercialising natural gas within the EU must be adapted to the principles of  a competitive 
and integrated market, and notably to the competition rules. 
The Commission is examining certain clauses which exist in some of  these contracts between 
gas producers and European importers and prevent the purchaser from selling the gas outside 
of  a defined territory. Such territorial restriction:.clauses are incompatible with the competition 
articles of  the Treaty (Article 81) as they prevent the free circulation of  gas within the internal 
market. 
Russian gas is normally delivered by Gazprom to the European importers at the EU border. In 
order to adapt the price to the competitive conditions to which each importer is confronted in 
their traditional market (i.e., normally, the Member State in which the importer is established) 
and to maximise its revenues in each Member State, Gazprom sells the gas at different prices 
to .different customers. In many cases, this price differential and the revenues optimisation 
strategy  behind  it  has  been  supported  by  a  territorial  restriction  clause,  forbidding  the 
customer from reselling the gas outside a defined area.  Such clauses are incompatible with 
established EC competition law as they clearly and artificially segregate national markets. 
Exploratory talks were held in Brussels on 12th  September 2001  between representatives of 
Gazprom,  the  Russian  administration  and  the  services  of the  Commission.  Following 
correspondence between the Commission and Gazprom during October and November, the 
President ofGazprom, Mr Miller visited Brussels on 18 and 19 December 2001, meeting with 
Commissioners Monti and Lamy, and with the Director Generals for Competition and for 
Energy  and  Transport.  On  21  and  22  January  2002,  the  Commission  services  met  with 
representatives ofGazprom in Moscow, and on 25 February 2002 in Brussels. 
Progress  has  been made  towards  resolving  this  issue.  In particular Gazprom has  already 
indicated that it is willing to not introduce the territorial restriction clauses in future contracts 
and that it is ready to discuss with its European clients the elimination of this clause in the 
existing contracts. It should be possible for Gazprom and the European importers to develop 
commercial alternatives that are compatible with European competition law while respecting 
the legitimate commercial interests of  Gazprom and its European contracting partners. While 
the  identification of and agreement upon such alternatives  is  the task of Gazprom and its 
partners, the ongoing dialogue with the Commission services may ensure the compatibility of 
these  alternatives  with  EC  competition  law  Different  possibilities  are  currently  under 
consideration and  grounds  for  optimism exist  that  a  mutually acceptable  solution to  this 
problem  can  be  found  that  respects  EC  competition  law  and  the  EU's  other  legitimate 
interests, as well as Gazprom's interests, even if significant work still remains to be done. It 
has been agreed that talks between the Commission's services and Gazprom will continue in 
the coming weeks. 
6 14  I 
3.3  Physical security of transport networks. 
As underlined in the Commission's Green Paper on Security of  Energy Supply
5
,  it is not just 
sufficient to secure a steady procurement of energy sources at reasonable prices on a  long 
term basis,  but also  to  ensure  the  security of the  energy transportation  networks.  In this 
context, a continuous assessment of the existing energy transportation systems developed by 
Russia is essential in order to both determine the rehabilitation requirements and the necessity 
for  further  extensions.  This  concern  was  reflected  in  the  Summit  conclusions  by  the 
commitment of  the European Union to "co-operate in the export networks, if  and when this is 
considered  necessary  by  the  Parties".  There  was  also  a  commitment  to  examine  the 
development  of a  regional  satellite  monitoring  system  for  accident  prevention  and  leak 
detection for oil and gas infrastructures. 
Technical assistance under the TACIS National Programme for Russia 2002-2003, as well as 
under  regional  co-operation  programmes,  have  already  been  identified  to  fund  a  joint 
evaluation of  the rehabilitation and the level of investments needed. The tendering process for 
this technical assistance will be launched shortly in the context of  the de-concentration of the 
Commission's external co-operation programmes. 
With  respect  to  the  safety  aspect,  discussions  are  ongoing  with  the  Russian  authorities 
concerning the possibility of creating a trans-European accident prevention and surveillance 
monitoring  system  for  the  gas  and  oil  transmission  infrastructure  covering pipelines  and 
tankers, as well as for hazardous oil products such as  LPG (Liquefied Petroleum products). 
Such a surveillance system could make use of satellite systems, notably the future European 
satellite navigational system GALILEO. Funds from TACIS have already been allocated for a 
feasibility study of such a  system and the Terms of Reference will  be discussed with the 
Russian companies concerned. 
To be comprehensive, such a monitoring system would necessarily also have to  cover the 
transit countries. Therefore it could be located within the framework of a "Trans-European 
Observatory for Accident Prevention and Surveillance in the Hydrocarbon Sector", which will 
bring together the EU, Russia and the transit countries. 
3.4  Projects of  "common interest". 
The Summit identified a number of  new transport infrastructures as being of common interest. 
Russia has indicated that it wants swift action on this issue, particularly with respect to the 
financing  aspects  and  access  to  international  finance  on  an  equitable  basis  with that  of 
European companies. While it is clear that the projects themselves will remain a matter for 
private sector decisions based upon economic and commercial judgements, it is intended that 
one or two high level experts will be mandated to assess each project of potential "common 
interest" by consulting interested parties to clearly define the technical requirements, the level 
of financing necessary and the timescale envisaged. The close co-operation of the Member 
States and European industry will be vital for ensuring that the assessments drawn up are as 
complete and accurate as possible, while it is important that Russia concentrates only on those 
projects which will enhance the security of energy supplies of  the EU. It is also clear that the 
current difficulties concerning certain clauses in some long term contracts for gas need to be 
resolved  rapidly to  ensure  that  these  "round  tables"  can  operate  in  a  fully  co-operative 
atmosphere. The results of  this work will be presented to a future EU-Russia Summit. 
5  Commission's Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the  security of energy supply". COM(2000) 
769 final. 
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·•  .  '  .....  '1'' . On the basis of  this work, for the limited number of  projects selected, high level, independent 
experts  will  then  be  called upon  to  assist  in promoting  the  financing  of the  investments 
required through a series of  "round tables" consisting of the Governments involved, financial 
institutions, the private financial sector and the energy companies. 
In the framework of the T  ACIS programme, the tendering process for the high level experts 
should  be  completed  shortly.  It  is  anticipated  that  the  experts  selected  would  begin 
immediately on consulting European companies, as well as  the appropriate Russian energy 
companies,  for  the  technical  and  financial  assessment  of the  first  projects  and  on  the 
preparation of the  first  meetings  and  round  tables.  The  Commission counts  on the  active 
support and collaboration of  the Member states and the European energy companies to ensure 
the success of  this operation. 
It is clear that the projects themselves and specific routes chosen remain the responsibility of 
the companies and States concerned, and the funding should primarily be a question for the 
private sector. 
The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline network through Belarus and Poland. 
The original Y  amal pipeline project was designed to bring gas from the planned new fields on 
theY  amal peninsula in Northern Siberia to serve the Russian market and also, via Belarus and 
Poland, to the EU market. While the link to the Y  amal fields is now unlikely over the medium 
term,  the first of the two pipelines planned across Poland has now been constructed and is 
operational, although it is currently only carrying about 17 Billion cubic metres, compared to 
its  full  capacity of 30  Billion cubic  metres,  due  to  an  incomplete  section  in  Belarus  and 
insufficient compression. The second pipeline, to be laid parallel to the first and with a similar 
capacity, is the project of  immediate interest. 
The Northern Trans-European pipeline. 
The agreement to conduct a feasibility study for this approximately 1  ,295 kilometre pipeline 
to transport Russian gas from Vyborg on Russia's Gulf of Finland coast under the Baltic Sea 
to northern Germany was signed in April 2001  between Gazprom and Finnish and  German 
companies. The capacity of the pipeline would be between 20 and 30 billion cubic metres a 
year and the estimated cost of  the project is 2.8 to 3.35 billion €uro
6
• The main source of the 
gas  for  this  pipeline  is  foreseen  to  be the new  Shtokman field,  although  it  could also  be 
supplied with gas from the existing fields in Northern Siberia. 
The development of  the Shtokman field 
The massive Shtokman field, which lies some 650 kilometres north-east of Murmansk in the 
Barents Sea, is estimated to contain some 3,200 Billion cubic metres at a depth of  330 metres. 
Output  would  rise  to  a  plateau  of around  90  billion  cubic  metres.  Under  the  envisaged 
arrangements Rosshelf, a Gazprom subsidiary, would have a 50%  share  in the project and 
four western companies would share the remaining 50% equally. The project  was approved 
for  development under Russia's Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)  law and  the  cost is 
estimated at over 22.3 billion €uros
7
.  While the field could be developed to use the second 
Y  amal  pipeline,  there  would  be  a  geographical  advantage  in connecting  the  field  to  the 
proposed Northern Trans-European pipeline. 
6  2.5 to 3 billion US dollars- calculated at the rate of I USD = 0.8955 €uros (2001  exchange rate) 
7  20 billion US dollars- calculated at the rate of l USD = 0.8955 €uros (2001 exchange rate) 
8 Connection of  the Druzhba oil transmission system with the Adria network. 
While the majority of  Russian oil is exported via a number ofterminals in the Baltic Sea and 
the port ofNovorossiysk on the Black Sea, crude oil also is exported into central Europe via 
the Druzhba pipeline which transits Belarus, with one branch crossing the Ukraine to Slovakia 
and Hungary and  the  more northerly branch crossing Poland to  Germany.  Environmental 
concerns  surrounding oil  exports  out of the  Black Sea  through the  increasingly crowded 
Bosphorus  lend  weight  to  diversifying  routes  for  Russian  exports  to  southern  Europe. 
Connecting  the  Druzhba  oil  transmission  system  with  the  existing  Adria  network8,  by 
reversing the latter's oil flow, would permit Russian oil to reach the Adriatic port of  Omisalj, 
from where it could be exported. 
A regional working group of  interested parties will be established and a meeting organised by 
the Commission in Brussels. 
3.5  Pilot projects in the rational use of energy and savings. 
In order to  give practical and achievable objectives to the challenging task of improving the 
rational use of energy and promoting energy saving,  the  Summit recommended that pilot 
projects be  carried out in two  climatically different regions  of Russia - Arkhangelsk and 
Astrakhan. 
Preliminary contacts have been made with the regional authorities in Astrakhan and a first 
exploratory mission to evaluate the possibilities took place during the week of 14-18 January 
2002 in Moscow and Astrakhan. The Commission delegation met with representatives of the 
Ministry of Energy, Gazprom, Lukoil and RAO UES in Moscow and subsequently with the 
Governor and authorities in Astrakhan in order to: 
- Establish an understanding with the Ministry of  Energy on how to proceed on the pilot 
progmmmes and identify key aspects of  the work; 
- To  familiarise  themselves  with the  energy situation  in Astrakhan,  to  explain to  the 
Astrakhan authorities the objectives of the pilot projects within the overall context of 
the  Energy Dialogue  and  to  exchange  views  on the  priorities  for  improvements  in 
energy efficiency and energy savings. 
To progress further, the Parties agreed on the necessity for a Memomndum of Understanding 
between the  European  Commission,  the  Russian  Ministry  of Energy  and  the  Astrakhan 
regional authorities. In addition, the following immediate priorities were identified during the 
visit: 
- the construction of a connecting pipeline from the local "TEZ-2" gas-fired power plant 
to  the  hot  water  distribution  system  in  the  city.  This  would  permit  the  hot  water 
currently wasted by the  power plant to  be used in the  city and  thereby reduce  the 
demand  on  the  city's  district  heating  plants.  The  investment  necessary  has  been 
estimated by the Russians at some 2.5 million €uro, but the savings of  natural gas in the 
district heating plants could be considerable. 
8  The Adria network currently carries Middle Eastern oil from the terminal at Omisalj on the Adriatic inland to 
the territories of  the former Yugoslavia and Hungary. 
9 the overall improvement of the district heating system, both in the distribution system 
and in the use of  heat in the individual houses, appears to offer a significant potential for 
energy savings. 
- addition of a  130 MW CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine) to the existing 100 MW 
"ORES" gas-fired combined heat and power plant, including waste heat utilisation. 
- The construction of  around 10 small, decentralised gas-fired Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP) plants in towns throughout the region. 
The Astrakhan authorities have been requested to provide further information and, if this is 
supplied rapidly, a two week in-depth review mission could take place in early April2002. 
Preliminary discussions  took place  with representatives  of the  Arkhangelsk authorities  in 
January 2002 and a visit to the region is planned for April 2002. 
3.6  Co-operation on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
The successful conclusion of the negotiations of the modalities of the Kyoto Protocol at the 
COP 7 meeting in Marrakesh in November 2001  puts important responsibilities on the energy 
policies of  the parties planning to ratify the protocol.  After the US withdrawal, ratification by 
the EU, Russia and Japan is a sine qua non for achieving the necessary representation of  55 % 
of 1990  C02 emissions  from  Annex-1  parties  (industrialised  countries),  required  for  the 
Protocol to come into force. 
In  addition  to  the  commitments  following  ratification,  the  Kyoto  Protocol  also  offers 
important  opportunities,  particularly  for  economies  in  transition  such  as  Russia  and  the 
Accession countries which generally have targets that will allow these countries to  be net 
sellers  of  emission  rights  under  the  flexible  mechanisms  (emissions  trading,  joint 
implementation) agreed in the Protocol. 
The first and absolutely necessary step to  formally open the possibility for benefiting from 
these co-operation possibilities is ratification of the Protocol.  The EU is  in the process of 
ratifying, aiming for a formal decision early enough to allow the Protocol to enter into force 
before the "Rio+  1  0" World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in August 
and September of  this year. It is very much to be hoped that the Russian indication of an early 
ratification will be consistent with this time frame. 
With the Protocol in force,  any co-operative project in energy savings or improved energy 
efficiency which "generates" a reduction in C02 emissions, will allow the resulting C02 credit 
to be transferred to the investor (for example in the EU) in accordance with the modalities in 
the Protocol.  This possibility will create an additional economic incentive for such projects 
over and above the incentive of  the value of  the energy saved. 
The  magnitude of this  incentive  will  depend  on the amount of energy saved and  on the 
specific value of  the C02 credits.  The value of  the these credits, in particular, is a subject of 
much uncertainty: 
Firstly, the concession on sinks (forests) agreed in Marrakesh has, de facto,  meant a 
reduction  in  the  commitments  for  several  parties  and  thereby  reduced  the  overall 
demand for C02 credits. 
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Secondly, the withdrawal of the US  implies a much more dramatic fall  in demand for 
C02 credits, probably to the extent that the available emission rights in Russia, Ukraine 
and  several  Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries  will  significantly  exceed  the 
requirements  of those  Annex  -1  parties  interested  in  acquiring  emission  rights  (EU, 
Japan, Canada, etc). 
It is unlikely that any potential investor would consider that a transfer of C02 emission rights 
is particularly valuable until there has been further clarification of  the interaction between the 
different flexible mechanisms and legislation in place which defines the rules for accepting 
transfers  of C02 permits  from  outside  the  European  Union.  Russia,  having  the  largest 
potential quantity of emission rights to sell through the Protocol's emissions trading and also 
the biggest potential  for joint implementation  projects  in  the  area  of energy savings  and 
energy  efficiency,  will  have  not  only  a  substantial  influence  on  the  development  of 
international emissions trading but will also play a key role in deciding the future framework 
of  joint implementation. 
3.7  Investment support scheme. 
A mechanism which targets the residual non-commercial risks associated with medium and 
long-term investments in oil and gas, exploration, development and transport, as well  as in 
energy  savings  and  improved  energy efficiency in Russia  could  help  to  stimulate  capital 
inflows.  This could  cover non-commercial  risks  such as breach of contract,  expropriation, 
civil disturbance and barriers to currency conversion and transfer. 
It is intended that the high level experts engaged to  assess projects of common interest will 
also work on defining a possible investment guarantee mechanism for non-commercial risks 
which could  be  co-financed by European  and  Russian  private  and public  sector financial 
bodies as well as by International Financial Institutions. They will work in close liaison with 
all  interested  parties,  including  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
(EBRD). One or two of the projects of common interest could then possibly be supported as 
pilot projects by this mechanism during 2003. 
It is clear, however, that the funding for such a scheme should primarily be a question for the 
private sector. 
Russia has insisted in its request for the European Investment Bank (EIB) to become active on 
its territory. A first step could be for EIB involvement in the energy transport infrastructure to 
supply energy resources from  Russia to  EU markets,  notably through the territories of the 
Accession countries. 
3.8  EU-Russia Energy Technology Centre. 
Reinforcing energy research and technology co-operation is a key element for deepening the 
Energy Dialogue. The Summit conclusions therefore underlined the importance of  creating an 
EU-Russia  Energy  Technology  Centre  in  Moscow,  noting  that  the  added  value  which 
co-operation between such a centre  and  any national  energy centre  set  up  under bilateral 
co-operation between Russia and an EU Member State should be taken into account. 
Since  the  Summit,  work  has  concentrated  on  compiling  an  inventory  of all  the  energy 
technology centres in Russia and undertaking the preparatory work to establish the EU-Russia 
Energy Technology Centre. 
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1'  t'  ,ijo.,<j,-.,,  '' Interest has already been expressed by a number of European entities, who would be obliged 
to  provide  additional  co-financing.  Current  thinking  is  for  the  work  of the  Centre  to  be 
grouped into  a number of work packages reflecting the  main priorities  highlighted  in  the 
report prepared by the thematic group on "Technology transfer and energy infrastructure" last 
year and to be led by two co-directors, one European and one Russian.  It is also important 
that the Centre act as a focus for EU-Russian co-operation in energy technology by closely 
co-operating with existing technology centres, be they funded by the European Community, 
the  Member  States  and/or  by  Russia,  and  to  be  in  premises  large  enough  to  permit 
conferences, workshops and seminars to be held. 
The objective is to inaugurate the Centre as soort as possible. 
3.9  Trade in electricity 
It is  clear that a number of preconditions need to be fulfilled before a substantial trade  in 
electricity can take place, such as reciprocity in market opening (giving equal access to EU 
companies on their territory), cost-based pricing, environmental protection and a high level of 
nuclear safety comparable to that which exists in the EU Member states. The Commission's 
Green Paper on Security of Energy Supply,  however,  underlined the  importance of better 
interconnections between the networks of the EU and those of the  applicant countries and 
Russia. Therefore a prior examination of the prospects for trade in electricity, the actual and 
potential bottlenecks in interconnection and the technical issues related to the incompatibility 
of the Russian electricity system with that of continental Europe could be undertaken. Once 
this is completed, the Commission would then be able to assess the prospects and the level of 
investment necessary. The funding of these investments should primarily be a matter for the 
private sector. 
Several technical assistance projects on this subject have already been completed and are now 
being examined in order to be in a position to agree an action plan with the Russian electricity 
company  RAO  UES.  Consideration  is  also  being  given  to  the  possible  updating  and 
implementation of  the recommendations contained in the 1999 T  ACIS report on this issue. 
3.10  Clean coal. 
Russia  is  the  world's  sixth  largest hard  coal  producer  and  coal  represents  some  16%  of 
Russia's total  primary energy supply.  While  production almost halved between  1988  and 
1998 as  the industry was heavily restructured, production is  now increasing. With Russian 
energy policy thinkers increasingly worried about too high a dependence internally on natural 
gas, the main provisions of Russia's recent "Energy Strategy until the year 2020" document 
project a 75% increase in coal production
9 and for an increasing role  for coal in electricity 
generation
10
, which in turn could liberate more natural gas for export. 
While any effort by Russia to increase coal-fired electricity generation at the expense of gas-
fired  generation is  obviously of concern in the  framework of climate  change,  the  Russian 
targets under Kyoto can certainly accommodate an expanded use of coal.  However, for the 
EU to  increase imports of natural  gas  from  Russia in order to help  meet its Kyoto targets 
could run counter to the overall objective of a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
9  From a 258 million tonnes in 2000 to between 340 and 430 million tonnes in 2020. 
10  The Strategy calls for coal-fired electricity generation to increase from  17% of total generation in  2000 to 
29% by 2020, which could double coal consumption in the power sector. 
12 unless a significant amount of the additional natural gas imported into the EU is  a result of 
energy efficiency and energy savings in Russia. 
In  this  context,  therefore,  it  is  important  that  any  increased  use  of coal  for  generating 
electricity  in  Russia  is  based  upon  modem,  efficient  and  cleaner  coal  combustion 
technologies. For this reason, and to promote the most efficient EU Clean Coal Technologies, 
Russia has been considered a priority in  the  2001  call for proposals
11  under the CARNOT 
programme
12  related to the promotion of the clean and efficient use of solid fuels,  and will 
likewise be a priority in the 2002 call for proposals. 
Two projects concerning Russia have been accepted under the 200 I call for proposals: 
"Cost Effective Clean  Coal Improvements to  Russian Utility Plant". Many of the old 
coal-fired plant in Russia operate at an average efficiency of between 27%  and 29%, 
compared to a typical efficiency in Europe of around 38% and some in the 42%-45% 
range.  The  objective  of the  project  will  be  to  gain  better  market  and  technical 
information  to  facilitate  the  technology  transfer of relatively  low  cost  methods  to 
improve  the  efficiency  and  environmental  performance  of conventional  coal-fired 
power  plants  in  Russia.  Three  workshops  will  be  held,  one  each  in  Moscow, 
Ekaterinberg  and  Novosibirsk,  to  exchange  information  and  to  present  recent 
developments and best practices. 
"Promotion of  Renovation Activities in the Russian Energy Sector". This study will be 
market  assessment  of the  perspectives  for  rebuilding/rehabilitating  coal-fired  power 
plants  in  Russia  to  increase  efficiencies  and  thereby  reduce  the  greenhouse  gas 
emissions.  On  the  basis  of this  work,  proposals  to  overcome  the  barriers  to  the 
deployment of  Clean Coal Technologies in Russia will be presented. 
3.11  The realisation of the EU's internal market in electricity and gas. 
It is evident in the discussions that Russia has had a perception that the development of the 
internal energy market in the EU will be injurious to their interests, rather than recognising 
the opportunities it may present. 
For gas, Russia sees the advantages of a unified market from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, 
but feared that, as the deadline for full market opening approaches, the whole concept of  long-
term supply contracts might be undermined by the transformation of the  gas market into a 
commodity market,  with  a  large  percentage of this market accounted for  by spot trading. 
Russia believes that such a scenario might endanger the existing and long-standing system for 
guaranteeing the return on the high  levels of investment necessary for developing new gas 
fields  and  transportation  networks.  In  discussions,  the  Commission  has  recognised  the 
importance that long term contracts have played in developing European gas markets.  Such 
contracts have provided a risk sharing arrangement between producers and buyers which has 
enabled  important  new  production  and  infrastructure  projects  to  be  undertaken.  The 
Commission has also clearly underlined that such contracts will remain important in European 
gas  supply to  the  extent needed  to  underpin  large  infrastructure  investments,  but  that  the 
contents  of  the contracts must be compatible with EU internal market  and competition rules. 
The evolution of the system of contractual arrangements can be made to  be in Gazprom's 
11  Call for proposals for 200 I. 
Published in the Official Journal of  the European Communities, C 270 of25.9.2001, page 8. 
12  Council Decision 1999/24/EC of 14.12.1998. 
Published in the Official Journal of  the European Communities, L 7 of 13.1.1999, page 28. 
13 interest too,  if sufficient  imagination and  entrepreneurial  effort is  devoted  to  the  subject. 
Certainly the Commission has encouraged further reflection in this regard and, in this sense, 
has wholeheartedly welcomed the opportunity to  assist at events  organised by the Russian 
Federation to  explore new avenues. A first  event has been proposed to take place soon in 
Moscow, taking in consumers, producers and regulatory authorities. 
With respect to electricity, the Commission has repeatedly stressed that there are a number of 
important preconditions that need to  be fulfilled before a substantial trade in electricity can 
take  place.  Western  Europe  is  currently  oversupplied,  whereas  Russia  has  a  generation 
deficit; first the reforms in Russia must ensure sufficient generating capacity for Russia's own 
domestic markets.  Once this has been achieved, the issue of reciprocity in market opening 
must  be  addressed,  as  well  as  related  trade  issues  such  as  cost-based  pricing  and 
environmental protection. It would be unacceptable to condone electricity trade unless there is 
a high level of nuclear safety in Russia, at least comparable to that which exists in the EU 
Member states.  However,  according to  the  Chairman of RAO-UES,  Mr A.  Chubais,  it  is 
currently possible  to  differentiate  electricity  generated by thermal  power plants  from  that 
generated from nuclear. He therefore believes that it would be possible to guarantee that any 
electricity exported into the EU would be from non-nuclear power plants.  It remains to  be 
seen whether such a distinction is possible. 
The creation of  the world's largest and most integrated energy market should not be seen by 
Russia as  a threat but as offering significant opportunities. However, in discussions, Russia 
has repeatedly raised a concern that, upon enlargement, the candidate countries will be subject 
to  some legal Community restriction on the percentage of fossil fuels that may be imported 
from one source. While the Commission's Green Paper on Security of Energy Supply does 
recommend  a  balanced  energy  mix  and  a  diversification  of energy  sources,  there  is  no 
mention of specific quotas nor is  there in any Community legislation. The Commission has 
-therefore  underlined  that  Russian  fears  of quantitative  restrictions  for  fossil  fuels  are 
unfounded, but Russia keeps maintaining this view in public declarations. 
In addition, the EU'  s experience in market opening could be useful as the Russian reform 
process  begins  to  address  the  future  of all  grid  natural  monopolies.  In this  context,  the 
Commission is  ready  and  willing  to  offer assistance  and  experience  on regulatory  issues 
necessary for investment,  such as  non-discriminatory access  to  the  transport infrastructure, 
separation of generation and transportation, and the concept of  a public service obligation. 
Success here could facilitate  the  future  integration of the  wider European market,  thereby 
enhancing security of energy supply and the optimum use of resources. The Commission will 
look at transferring know-how and experience on the regulatory front to Russia and will seek 
to ensure that, as systems develop, they develop together and not apart. 
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